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Not long ago I was asked to speak at a seminar in the Treasury and to answer 
the following question, “What difference would it make if we really tried to make 
people happier?”1  To my mind that is exactly the right question, so let me share with 
you my rather inadequate answer.  In particular I want to bring out where it differs 
from the normal answers given by economists, especially from bodies like the OECD. 
 
My main message will be that happiness depends on a lot more than your 
purchasing power.  It depends on your tastes, which you acquire from your 
environment – and on the whole social context in which you live.  So, when we 
evaluate policies which increase purchasing power, we absolutely must take those 
other effects into account.  Finally I shall come back to the question of our objectives 
and say why I think Bentham was right and the greatest happiness should be the 
agreed goal of our society. 
 
 
SOME EVIDENCE 
 
Let me start with the evidence on what makes people happy.  Of course this is 
still very partial, but there have been huge strides by psychologists and by some 
economists like Andrew Oswald who has been a major figure in this field, beginning 
in our Centre and now at Warwick. 
 
Most of the research points to 7 main factors, which I have listed here in no 
particular order (Figure 1).  They are income, work, private life, community, health, 
freedom, and a philosophy of life.  We discussed the significant but limited impact of 
income yesterday, and today I want to compare the effect of other factors with that of 
income. 
 
This table (Table 1) is based partly on Andrew Oswald’s work on the 
Eurobarometer data but mainly on a paper by John Helliwell which used the World 
                                                 
1 Precede with story about the Bishop of Lincoln. 
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Values Surveys of 1981, 91 and 96, which cover 90,000 individuals in 46 different 
countries.  Where the two surveys overlap, they give broadly similar results. 
 
The idea of the table is quite simple.  We measure a person’s happiness and 
then we try to explain it by a whole battery of facts about their situation.  In each row 
of the table we are measuring how each factor affects happiness, others factors being 
held constant.2  To think about the size of these effects, we compare the size of each 
effect with the effect of income.  So, we choose the units of happiness so that, when 
family income falls by a third relative to average income, happiness falls by 1 unit. 
 
Table 1 
Effects on happiness 
 Fall in happiness (index) 
 
Income 
 Family income down 33% relative to average 
 
Work 
 Unemployed (rather than employed) 
 Job insecure (rather than secure) 
 Unemployment rate up 10 percentage points 
 Inflation rate up 10 percentage points 
 
Family 
 Divorced (rather than married) 
 Separated (rather than married) 
 Widowed (rather than married) 
 
Health 
 Subjective health down 1 point (on a 5-point scale) 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 3 
 1.5 
 1.5 
 0.5 
 
 
 2.5 
 4.5 
 2 
 
 
 3 
 
 
Source of all rows except 3-5: Helliwell (2001), Equation 2. To find the effect of a 33% 
decrease in family income I assume that we move from the 6th decile group to the 4th decile 
group – (correct for the UK, see O.N.S. Economic Trends, April 2000, p.62). 
Source of row 3: Blanchflower and Oswald (1999), Table 7. V. approximate. 
Source of rows 4-5: Di Tella, MacCulloch and Layard (2002). 
 
Compared with this, let’s start with the effect of personal unemployment, 
excluding any effect coming through lower income.  As you can see, there is a very 
                                                 
2 Other independent variables come in Table 2. The Helliwell study also controls for education and 7 
country fixed effects (Western Europe and US, Scandinavia, FSU, CEE, Latin America, Asia, Other), 
though dropping the fixed effects makes little difference. The Di Tella et al study covers all EU 
countries from 1975-97 and controls for country and time fixed effects. 
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large non-income effect of unemployment.  For people in work there is also a big 
effect of job insecurity, in the next row.  And in the row below that we can see that a 
rise in general unemployment is deeply disturbing, even if you’re not unemployed 
yourself – and more disturbing than an equal percentage point rise in inflation. 
 
Moving on to the influence of private life, our family variables here are a poor 
proxy for troubled private lives and there is certainly some reverse causality – with 
unhappy people being more likely to divorce.  Even so these are huge numbers and 
confirm how important family influences are, when compared with income.  So is the 
health of the individual.  Moreover, as we know from yesterday, if society as a whole 
decreased its income by a third, the happiness of each individual would not fall by 1 
unit but by less, due to the fact that everyone was suffering together.  So you can see 
just how important these other influences are. 
 
I think the table is really informative and it is confirmed by other studies using 
different data.  Notice that none of the findings could have been obtained by the 
standard method of economics, which is to infer valuation from behaviour (via so-
called revealed preference).  Nor would they have been obtained by the normal 
psychological method of asking hypothetical questions about how people would value 
changes.  Instead they reflect the most obvious and direct way of establishing what 
causes X – namely to measure X in this case happiness and see what factors influence 
it. 
 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The findings are pretty devastating in their policy implications.  Let me begin 
with policies towards work. 
 
Work, job security and stress 
Whichever country you study, unemployment is for most people a major 
disaster.3  This comes not only from comparing people who are currently employed 
                                                 
3 Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2002), Table A.1. 
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and unemployed, but also from looking at the same people as they move from 
employment to unemployment, and back again.4  It is a disaster similar to marriage 
break-up – in each case you cease to be needed. 
 
This is in marked contrast to the assumptions of many economists who 
consider the main loss from unemployment to be the loss of income to society as a 
whole, adjusted downwards for the value of increased leisure.  But our analysis shows 
the huge psychic impact of unemployment on the unemployed person, on top of 
whatever income the unemployed person loses.  That is why low unemployment 
should be a key goal for any government.  It also means that almost any job is better 
than no job.  That is something which you are not allowed to say in France or 
Germany at present, but the evidence supports it.  That is why I believe strongly in 
welfare-to-work. 
 
If unemployment is such a disaster, it is also not surprising that, even when 
people are in work, they are much happier if they feel their job is secure.  Yet there 
are powerful voices arguing that we cannot afford to offer the job security which we 
once thought reasonable.  At OECD flexibility is the name of the game.  But how can 
we not afford security now that we are richer, when we could afford it when we were 
poorer? 
 
One possible answer is that employment protection was bad for employment 
in the past as well as now.  But the majority of economists dispute that.5  A second 
answer could be increasing globalisation, which is supposed to have reduced the 
potential for stable employment.  But, as a matter of fact, in the British workforce as a 
whole, job tenures are as high as they ever were.6  And, as a matter of principle, a 
country can always accept lower real wages if that is the price of the security we 
would prefer. 
 
This choice is not however open to an individual since, if he asks for more 
security in return for a lower wage, it casts doubt on his willingness to work.  So 
                                                 
4 Winkelman and Winkelman (1998). 
5 See Nickell and Layard (1999) and references therein. 
6 See for example Taylor (2002), Table 4. 
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collective action (including legislation) to provide reasonable job security is an 
important element of a civilised society.  But most Americans still consider that 
European labour relations are far too gentlemanly.  It is not surprising that Europeans 
want to keep their own way of doing things, especially when Continentals north of the 
Mediterranean have achieved US hourly productivity without US levels of insecurity. 
 
There is also the question of the pace of work.  In order to improve 
performance, workers are under increasing pressure to achieve targets.  This is leading 
to increased stress.  For example in 1996 the Eurobarometer survey asked employed 
people in every country whether in the last 5 years there had been a “significant 
increase in the stress involved in your job”.  Nearly 50% said Yes, it had increased, 
and under 10% said it had diminished.  Figures for Britain were similar to the 
European average.7 
 
Some might argue that this is the pace of work which people have chosen.  But 
not all options are in practice available.  For example US lawyers now work harder 
than they used to, and a survey of associates in US law firms showed that they would 
like to work shorter hours for less pay.8  But the problem of the lemon is at work 
again – the person who first proposes this is felt to show lack of commitment.  And 
the partners in the firm are in fact using work hours as a test of other qualities which 
they cannot observe. 
 
So we need a new approach to the work-life balance.  I discussed a part of this 
strategy yesterday – it is the simple mechanism of taxation.  But we also need a 
change in cultural priorities, so that performance (i.e. GDP) is put into its proper 
place. 
 
And how should we regard the standard OECD view that we need more 
entrepreneurship and risk-taking?  Such statements are of course contrary to standard 
economic theory, which says that no one set of tastes is better than any other.  What is 
however clear is that for most people the desire for security is a central part of their 
nature.  That is why we set up the Welfare State and introduced stabilisation policy in 
                                                 
7 Blanchflower and Oswald (2000), Table 19. 
8 Landers et al (1996). 
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every advanced country.  Of course mistakes have been made, and in many countries 
income is guaranteed to people even if they ignore the work that is available.  But, as 
we become richer, it must be mad if, at the same time, we become less secure and 
more stressed.  Both security and a quiet mind are normal goods, which should be 
increased (not decreased) as people become richer. 
 
Yet the Anglo-American elite glorify novelty.  Nothing is good unless 
“innovative”.  Civil servants gaily reorganise every public service, oblivious of how 
each reorganisation destroys a major channel of personal security and trust.  I believe 
we have a lot to learn from “old Europe”, where the value of stability is better 
understood. 
 
Secure families and communities 
Turning to security in the family and the community, I am no expert.  I want to 
discuss only one factor – geographical mobility.  This illustrates the problem which 
arises when policies are adopted because they increase GDP, even though they may 
have other effects on happiness which are negative.  Economists are generally in 
favour of geographical mobility since it moves people from places where they are less 
productive to ones where they are more productive.  But clearly geographical mobility 
increases family break-up and criminality. 
 
If people live where they grew up, close to their parents and their old friends, 
they are probably less likely to break up.  They have a network of social support, 
which is less common in more mobile situations. 
 
Similarly, if people are highly mobile, they feel less bonded to the people 
among whom they live, and crime is more common.9  The evidence shows that crime 
is lower when people trust each other,10 and that people trust each other more if fewer 
people are moving house and the community is more homogenous.11  These are really 
                                                 
9 Glaeser and Di Pasquale (1999); Sampson et al (1997). 
10 Halpern (2001). 
11 On inter-area data for US see Alesina and La Ferrara (2000). On cross-country data see Knack and 
Keefer (1997, Table VII), though La Porta et al (1997, p.337) show little bivariate relation between 
trust and ethno-linguistic diversity. At the experimental level Harvard students are less likely to behave 
in a trusting and trustworthy way towards members of other nationalities or ethnic groups (Glaeser et 
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important findings.  For, if we look at the failures of modern societies, the growth of 
crime is surely the most obvious failure.  And in some countries it is closely linked to 
a decline in trust, to which I shall return.  Similarly, mental illness is more likely if 
you live in an area where your group is in the minority than if you live where your 
group is in the majority.  If mobility has this cost, it should be taken into account 
before Europeans are urged to match US levels of geographical mobility, or indeed 
immigration. 
 
Mental and physical health 
Let me then move to a more individual condition - health.  Self-reported health 
is strongly related to happiness.  But there is the standard selectivity problem here, 
and objective measures of health are much less closely correlated with happiness 
except in cases of severe chronic pain.12  One conclusion is that the social 
arrangements for health care should be taken very seriously, relative to the targets for 
objective health.  But, more important, mental health is the health variable that is 
much the most closely related to happiness.  Most of the worst unhappiness is caused 
by mental disorders, especially depression and schizophrenia. 
 
It is a complete scandal that we spend so little on mental health.  Mental 
illness causes half of all the measured disability in our society and, even if you add in 
premature death, mental illness accounts for a quarter of the total impact of disease.  
Yet only 12% of the NHS budget goes on it and 5% of the MRC budget.  Roughly 
25% of us experience serious mental illness during our lives, and about 15% 
experience major depression.  Such depression can in most cases be helped by a 
combination of drugs and cognitive therapy.  Yet only a quarter of people now 
suffering from depression are being treated, and most of them just get pills from a 
non-specialist GP.  If we really wanted to attack unhappiness, we would totally 
change all this, and make psychiatry a central, high-prestige part of the NHS. 
 
Indeed in OECD countries since the War the single most striking improvement 
in human happiness has been among those who suffer from schizophrenia and 
                                                                                                                                            
al, 2000). Note also that a person is more likely to be mentally ill when fewer people in the community 
come from his ethnic group (see Halpern and Nazroo, 1999). 
12 See Seligman (2002); Brief et al (1993). 
 8
RL352d  5 March 2003 
depression, who were untreatable before the War and can now be helped.  So at this 
point let me speculate somewhat wildly.  Even already, after only 50 years of 
research, many people are helped by Prozac to “feel themselves” rather than some 
sub-standard person that they only half recognise.  As drug research advances, it 
would be surprising if more and more people could not be helped to be what they feel 
is the real them. 
 
Political and personal freedom 
What about the bigger community – the system of government and laws under 
which we live?  From our earlier comparison of countries it was obvious that people 
hated Communism, even apart from its effect on income.  The finding is confirmed 
econometrically in Table 2 which continues the multiple regression analysis which 
began in our first Table.  The index of political standards here involves a measure of 
the standard of governance in six different dimensions, and the result shows a huge 
difference in happiness associated with a government like that of post-Communist 
Hungary as compared with still-Communist Belarus.  There are at least three 
dimensions to freedom: political influence (on government policy); personal freedom 
(eg free speech); and economic freedom (to do business).  All three are at work in 
these inter-country results. 
 
A recent study of political democracy has produced remarkable results.  Bruno 
Frey has compared happiness in those Swiss cantons with the most frequent referenda 
with happiness in those Swiss cantons with the least frequent referenda.  The resulting 
difference in happiness is roughly equal to the effect of a doubling of income.13  This 
has obvious implications for the rebirth of local democracy. 
 
                                                 
13 Frey and Stutzer (2002). 
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Table 2 
Effects on happiness (continued) 
 Rise in happiness (index) 
 
Income 
 Family income up 50% relative to average 
 
Freedom 
 Quality of government improves 
  Hungary 1995 rather than Belarus 1995 
 
Religion 
 “God is important in my life” 
  You say Yes, holding  
  church attendance constant 
 
Trust 
 “In general, people can be trusted” 
  You say Yes, not No 
  Others saying Yes rise 50 percentage points 
 
Morality 
 Tax morality – “Cheating on taxes is never 
 justifiable” 
  You say Yes, not No 
  Others saying Yes rise 50 percentage points 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 2.5 
  
  
  
 2 
 
 
 
 1 
 0.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 0.7 
  
Source: Helliwell (2001), Equation 2. To find the effect of a 50% increase in family income I 
assume that we move from the 4th decile group to the 6th decile group. 
 
Conclusions so far 
So before I come to values, let me summarise the main policy points I have 
made in this and the preceding lecture. 
1. Self-defeating work should be discouraged by suitable taxation. 
2. Producers matter as much as consumers.  They should be incentivated 
more by professional norms and not by ever more financial incentives. 
3. We should not promote the search for status, and we should limit 
dysfunctional advertising. 
4. Income should be redistributed towards where it makes most difference. 
5. Secure work should be promoted by welfare-to-work and reasonable 
employment protection.  Secure pensions may require a state earnings-
related scheme. 
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6. Security at home and in the community will be reduced if there is too 
much geographical mobility. 
7. Mental health should receive much higher priority. 
8. We should actively promote participatory democracy. 
 
But there is also a more general conclusion about the limited power of 
economics to resolve policy issues on its own.  Almost any policy that affects income 
also affects happiness through non-income channels, which need to be taken into 
account in any proper cost-benefit analysis.  For example in Figure 1 mobility raises 
income which increases happiness.  But it may also reduce the security of families 
and communities and thus reduce happiness.  We cannot have good policy unless we 
have a major programme of quantitative research on the size of all the non-income 
channels affecting human welfare.  Economic theory cannot have the only say, as it 
does in this diagram. 
 
And then there is a second point about the effect of economic theory – via its 
effect on values.  Economic theory assumes that people are normally selfish.  As I 
shall show, such teaching can adversely affect people’s values, and people’s values 
have a major influence on the happiness of society.  I want to end these lectures by 
discussing the role of values. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
Happiness
Family
security
Good
valuesIncome
Mobility
Economic
theory
+
+
+ + +
_
_
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11
RL352d  5 March 2003 
A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 
 
Mood control 
There are two aspects to a philosophy of life – how you interact with yourself 
and how you interact with others.  Obviously people are happier if they are able to 
appreciate what they have, whatever it is; and if they do not always compare 
themselves with others; and if they can school their own moods.  I think David 
Goleman is right about emotional intelligence: it exists and it can be taught by parents 
and teachers.14  You probably know Sir Henry Wootton’s description of the happy 
man, which ends: 
 
That man is freed from servile bands  
Of hope to rise or fear to fall, 
Lord of himself though not of lands, 
That having nothing yet hath all 
 
But the clearest statement I know is in Victor Frankl’s book on Man’s Search for 
Meaning when he wrote about his experiences in Auschwitz and concluded that 
(quotes) “everything can be taken from a man but one thing, the last of human 
freedoms – to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances”.15 
 
Different people have different ways of disciplining their minds and their 
moods – from cognitive therapy, to Buddhist mindfulness, to the 12 Steps of 
Alcoholics Anonymous, to the spiritual exercises of St Ignatius.  People find comfort 
from within, in all sorts of ways, but these generally include some system of relying 
for help on the deep positive part of yourself, rather than on the scheming ego. 
 
Some people call this God, and Table 2 reports one of the most robust findings 
of happiness research: that people who believe in God are happier.  But no research 
has sorted out how far belief causes happiness or how far happiness encourages belief, 
and in any case no one should believe if it goes against their reason.  
 
                                                 
14 Goleman (1996). 
15 Frankl (1985) p.89. 
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Relations with others 
So happiness depends on how you interact with yourself, but it also depends 
on how you interact with others, and on how you perceive them.  People are much 
happier if they feel they live in a friendly and harmonious world.  In many countries 
surveys have regularly asked, ‘Would you say that most people can be trusted? – or 
would you say that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’16  As Table 2 
shows, those who say they trust people are happier.  In addition people are happier 
when surrounded by people who are trusting. 
 
Yet, depressingly, on these measures trust has been declining sharply in both 
the US and Britain.  Here are the figures. 
 
Table 3 
Percent who think most people can be  
trusted (Britain) 
1959 56 
1981 43 
1995 31 
 Source: Hall (1999), p.432 and World Values Survey 1995. 
 
Figure 2 
% who say “most people can be trusted”, US 
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 Source: Putnam (2000) p.140. 
                                                 
16 Glaeser et al (2000) give behavioural evidence that Harvard students who express trust are in fact 
more ‘trustworthy’ than others (but only marginally more ‘trusting’). 
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They show that in Britain in the late 1950s near 60% of people felt that most other 
people could be trusted.  By the 1990s this had fallen to around 30%.  There was a 
similar fall over the same period in the US.17 
 
I do not want to sound like an old fuddy duddy, and certainly not to be one.  
And there have always been Cassandras who said that things are going to pot.  But the 
following evidence seems to me to be extremely important.  In 1952 half of all 
Americans thought people led “as good lives – moral and honest – as they used to”.  
So there was no majority for the view that things are going to pot.  But by 1998 there 
was a 3-to-1 majority for precisely that view.18 
 
Table 4 
% saying that people lead “as good lives –  
moral and honest – as they used to”, US 
 
1952 51 
1965 43 
1976 32 
1998 27 
 
What has caused these changes is not at all clear.  Increased mobility and 
increased family break-up may have contributed.  But there were surely intellectual 
influences, especially through the assumptions which people imbibe in childhood.  In 
this context it is interesting that the downward trend in trust in the US is not because 
individual people have become less trustful over their lifetime – but because each 
generation has started their adult life less trustful than their predecessors did.19  This 
suggests that we urgently need to reinforce moral education in the curriculum of our 
schools.  But what moral philosophy should we espouse? 
 
The moral vacuum 
If we look at the last hundred years, the most obvious change in our ideas has 
been the decline in religious belief, caused by the progress of Darwinian science.  
                                                 
17 In 1976Europe and Japan we only have comprehensive figures since 1980 (World Values Survey).  
These sho1998w no country with a decline in trust and some with an increase over that shorter period. 
18 Putnam (2000) p.139. 
19 Putnam (2000) p.141. 
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This removed the sanction of the after-life.  However for some time the effect of this 
change was masked by the rise of socialism or quasi-socialism as a moral code 
involving mutual obligation.  But the failure of socialism-in-action left a vacuum 
which has been filled by relatively untrammelled individualism. 
 
As Robert Putnam has documented, this individualism has become the 
dominating ideology in Western culture since the late 1970s.  Economists support it 
by the Smithian argument that the pursuit of self-interest will lead via the invisible 
hand to the social optimum.  All that society has to do in the extreme model is to 
establish property rights and a strong legal framework. 
 
Yet all our experience shows that this is wrong – that contracts cannot be 
specified fully enough and courts cannot operate efficiently enough to produce good 
outcomes, unless most people already have a taste for good behaviour.  More 
important, the pursuit of individual self-interest is not a good formula for personal 
happiness.  You will be happier if you also obtain happiness from the good fortunes of 
others.  In fact the doctrine that your main aim must be self-advancement is a formula 
for producing anxiety. 
 
In this context the role of economics teaching is truly problematic.  We tell 
people that they are selfish and it is not surprising that they become more so.  Robert 
Frank asked students at Cornell whether they would report it if they were 
undercharged for a purchase, and whether they would return a lost addressed envelope 
which contained $100.  They were asked in September and again in December after 
one term’s work.  Students who took introductory economics became less honest, 
while astronomy students became more honest, and the difference was significant.20  
Similarly, when playing the Prisoners Dilemma game, economics students were less 
likely to cooperate than other students and the gap widened the longer people studied 
economics.  As time passes, economics teaching is seeping increasingly into our 
culture.  This has many good results but also the bad one, of justifying selfishness. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Frank et al (1996), p.190, and Frank et al (1993). See also Rhoads (1985). 
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BACK TO BENTHAM 
 
So we are in a situation of moral vacuum, where there are no agreed concepts 
of how unselfish a person should be, or of what constitutes a good society.  I want to 
suggest that the right concept is the old Enlightenment one of the greatest happiness.  
The good society is the one where people are happiest.  And the right action is the one 
which produces the greatest happiness. 
 
This is not a currently fashionable view among philosophers.  But they do not 
offer any alternative overarching theory which would help us to resolve our moral 
dilemmas.  Instead they support various separate values: promise-keeping, kindness, 
truthfulness, fairness and so on.  But what do we do when they conflict?  What should 
I do if I have promised to go to my daughter’s play and my father is taken to hospital 
– keep my promise or be kind to my father?  I see no way in which conflicts between 
principles could be resolved without reference to some overarching principle.  And 
that principle would surely focus on the feelings of the people affected.  The question 
is how strongly each of them would feel if I did not turn up. 
 
As I see it, moral philosophy is not about a limited set of moral dilemmas, but 
about the whole of life – how each of us should spend our time and how society 
should allocate its resources.  Such issues cannot be resolved without an overarching 
principle.  ‘Do as you would be done by’ might seem to be one such principle but it 
provides little guidance on how the state should treat anyone, be he a criminal, a 
minor or a taxpayer.  And, even in private morality, it seems to require an excessive 
disregard of the person one knows best, which is oneself.   
 
So I want to propose the principle of the greatest happiness.  First let me deal 
with some of the objections21 and then attempt to justify the principle. 
 
Some people object that the concept of happiness is too vague or too 
hedonistic – which I hope I dealt with in the first lecture.  Others object to the fact that 
actions are judged only by their consequences, as if this meant that the nature of the 
                                                 
21 See for example Williams in Smart and Williams (  ). 
 16
RL352d  5 March 2003 
action itself is immaterial.  But of course the feelings produced at the time of the 
action are as much a part of its consequences as the whole stream of feelings 
thereafter.  Others argue that you cannot become happy by trying, so it is inconsistent 
to consider happiness the goal.  Even if it were true, it is a non-sequitur since we have 
all kinds of goals that can only be pursued indirectly.  And finally there is the 
argument that utilitarianism does not imply any basic rights, which I would deny since 
people become so miserable without them while the rest of society gains less.22   
 
If the critics offered a convincing alternative ideology for public and private 
morality, we could argue about which was better.  But, since none is offered, we have 
the choice between a society with no comprehensive philosophy or one that embraces 
utilitarianism. 
 
Even so, why should one accept the utilitarian objective?  I would base it on 5 
propositions, which show that it is a logical development of our nature.  Let me state 
the propositions first and then try to justify them at more length. 
 
1. It is in our nature to want to be happy.  On Monday I explained how this acts as 
a basic motivational mechanism, which has led to our survival. 
2. We also want our relatives to be happy, a parent’s love being the strongest 
example. 
3. As regards relationships outside the family, humans are innately sociable and in 
varying degrees helpful to each other.  We know genes are involved in this 
because twin studies show that the trait of cooperativeness is partly heritable.  
This trait provides the emotional support for the development of a moral theory. 
4. So does our next trait, which is an inbuilt sense of fairness, which requires at the 
very least the equal treatment of equals. 
5. To these ingredients we bring the power of reason, which reasons about moral 
issues in much the same way that it reasons about the working of the natural 
world.  In both cases it seeks a unified theory.  In natural science this has paid 
                                                 
22 Many critics have objected to the principle of simply adding up different people’s happiness, see Sen 
(1999). Here some other method of combination could be adopted if a convincing case were made. It 
would mean giving more weight to a gain in happiness if the person’s happiness was low. The problem 
here is that we ought also to have regard for the feelings of animals, yet their level of happiness is 
probably low (due to their lower level of awareness).  Should we therefore give more weight to 
improved happiness in non-humans than in humans? 
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off handsomely and made us masters of the earth.  In moral philosophy there has 
been less progress but, if we persevere, we surely have a chance to better master 
ourselves. 
 
Let me end this lecture by discussing these various steps. 
 
Man’s partial unselfishness 
Humans naturally seek the good of more than themselves.  At least they seek 
the good of their kin.  But fruitful enterprises with non-relatives also require 
cooperation.  Natural selection will punish those who cannot cooperate with others, 
and who instead seek only their short-run gain.  So natural selection will select 
cooperative people, and it will also select those societies which educate their people to 
be cooperative. 
 
It’s convenient to discuss this in the standard context of the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, involving two people.  If we both cooperate, we both do better than if we 
are both selfish.  But how can I ensure that, if I cooperate, you do not cheat?  In a 
series of simulations Axelrod showed that, if I had to deal with you a lot, whatever 
strategy you followed, I would on average do best to follow Tit for Tat.23  This means 
that I would start off cooperating but, if you acted selfishly, so would I, until you 
started cooperating again, when I would then again cooperate.  Thus, in the struggle 
of life, people would do best who were initially cooperative, but also ready to protect 
their back. 
 
We humans are roughly that sort of people and this could well be because 
natural selection operated like a series of Axelrod’s simulations, from which people 
with our kind of strategy emerged victorious.  In the lingo of geneticists Tit-for-Tat is 
an evolutionary stable strategy which will see off personality types who operate 
differently. 24 
 
However our instincts for interacting with each other have also been refined 
by upbringing and the values we have been taught.  And the result of this joint 
                                                 
23 Axelrod (1984). 
24 Nesse (2002). Frank. 
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product of nature and nurture is that we cooperate to an important extent because it 
makes us feel better.  Here is a little evidence from an experiment in which people’s 
brains were monitored while playing the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.  When they made 
cooperative moves in the game, their brains showed the standard signs of pleasurable 
activity, and not otherwise.25  And this happened before they knew the outcome of the 
game and whether the other player had cooperated.  To that extent virtue is its own 
reward. 
 
Notice that I am not here talking about reciprocal altruism – giving favours in 
expectation of favours returned.  I am talking about something that goes beyond that, 
and explains why we help many people we will never meet again.  We tip taxi-
drivers, vote in elections and even dive after drowning people that we do not know.  
These social feelings are deep inside us and can even lead us to sacrifice our lives.  
But they have survived the stringent test of natural selection because people who are 
made like that are liked by other people and used for rewarding activities.  They are 
liked because they do not always calculate. 
 
That said, we do also watch our back.  In repeated interactions with people we 
withdraw cooperation if they behave badly.  And in one-off interactions, we take care 
to find out about the person’s previous reputation. 
 
So people who behave badly do generally get punished, and good behaviour 
springs not only from natural sociability but also from the fear of being caught.  Both 
are necessary since natural sociability is not universal.  But natural sociability should 
not be underestimated – and it can of course be encouraged further by good moral 
education, provided there is a clear moral philosophy to be taught. 
 
So now we come to the conscious formulation of our morality.  We seem to 
have an inherited instinct for fairness, as shown by a whole host of psychological 
experiments and by the existence of the concept in every known human society.  So if 
we value our own happiness, it is only fair if we value equally the happiness of others.  
This is harder for some people to do than for others and it is certainly easier the more 
                                                 
25 Rilling et al (2002). They did not distinguish between the first play and subsequent plays. 
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naturally benevolent we are.  But, stepping outside ourselves, it seems extremely 
natural to say that the best state for society is where the people are happiest – each 
counting for one.  And, going on, right actions are those which promote that state of 
society. 
 
You could of course argue that rather than look for a clear philosophy we 
should just stick with our various different moral intuitions.  But that was not the way 
we progressed in our understanding of nature.  We did not stick with our partial 
intuitive concepts of causality.  We sought desperately for a unified theory which 
could cover all kinds of disparate phenomena – the fall of the apple and the rotation 
of the moon, and so on.  It is surely in our nature to make moral progress by the 
search for an overarching moral principle, and by its widespread adoption. 
 
I do believe such progress is possible.26  In the West we already have a society 
that is probably as happy as any there has ever been.  But there is a danger that Me-
First may pollute our way of life, now that divine punishment no longer provides the 
sanction for morality.  If that happened, we should all be less happy.  So we do need a 
clear philosophy.  The obvious aim is the greatest happiness of all – each person 
counting for one.  If we all really pursued that, we should all be less selfish, and we 
should all be happier. 
 
So my conclusion is: bully for Bentham.  Let me end with these words from a 
birthday letter which he wrote shortly before he died to the daughter of a friend.  He 
wrote: ‘Create all the happiness you are able to create: remove all the misery you are 
able to remove.  Every day will allow you to add something to the pleasure of others, 
or to diminish something of their pains.  And for every grain of enjoyment you sow in 
the bosom of another, you shall find a harvest in your own bosom; while every sorrow 
which you pluck out from the thoughts and feelings of a fellow creature shall be 
replaced by beautiful peace and joy in the sanctuary of your soul’.27  I call that pretty 
good advice. 
 
                                                 
26 Wright (2000) argues convincingly that the properties of the universe makes probable the eventual 
emergence of conscious beings , capable of love. 
27 Written 22 June 1830 and found in the birthday album of a friend’s daughter.  Quoted in B Parekh 
(ed.), Jeremy Bentham Critical Assessments, Vol.I, p.xvii. 
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